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He is usually an Italian, but he isn’t1
Katarzyna Kijania-Placek 
Jagiellonian University, Krakow 
In a recent article “Traditionally, I am entitled  to a last meal“ (Orga-
non F 18, 2011, No. 1) Bjørn Jespersen argued against treating the de-
scriptive uses of indexicals as an argument for the revision of the se-
mantics of indexicals – he opposed the view argued for by Nunberg 
(1991, 1992, 1993, 1995, 2004, 2004a), Recanati (1993, 2005), Kijania-
Placek (2010, 2010a) and others that on their descriptive uses indexi-
cals contribute general concepts instead of individual ones to the 
proposition expressed and generate general instead of singular propo-
sitions. These kind of uses were first systematically studied by Nun-
berg and the main paper on the subject is still his “Indexicality and 
deixis”. Jespersen relies on a version of Nunberg’s example and I will 
use it as well to explain the main idea.  
 Jespersen challenges the very definition of the descriptive uses of 
indexicals by claiming that in such cases a nonsensical proposition is 
being expressed but is used to communicate a related proposition that 
does make sense. He does not give arguments as to why we should 
believe that nonsense is expressed but rather provides a mechanism 
that shows why it is that utterances which according to him are non-
sensical or sloppy take place.  
 
 I will question his arguments on two counts. First, I will question 
his general strategy that requires the assumption that people commu-
nicate with nonsense on a regular basis as well as his definition of  
a nonsensical utterance. An account that does not require interpreting 
speaker’s utterances as systematically nonsensical, if available, is pre-
ferable to an account that requires that. I will outline such an account, 
which I have proposed in (2010) and (2010a), in the last section. Addi-
tionally, I will try to show that the solution proposed by Jespersen, 
                                                 
1  The preparation of this paper was supported by the Polish Ministry of 
Science and Higher Education Grant N N101 132736 as well as a grant 
from the Jagiellonian University, WRBW2010. 
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even if it worked for this particular example he considers, will not do 
for others and, as such, cannot provide an explanation of the pheno-
menon in question.  
 Jespersen suggests that before 
attempting to carry out a semantic analysis, I recommend first making 
it unambiguous and explicit what the intended message is and only 
then feeding the resulting sanitized, quasi-natural linguistic fragment 
into the machine of semantic analysis. (p. 6-7) 
This recommendation is ambiguous but I tend to agree with its liberal 
reading: semantic analysis requires some level of abstraction from the 
context and that is what I will assume in my analysis as well. We must 
just be careful not to abstract from those elements of the context that 
are truth-conditionally relevant. After all, most sentences of natural 
language do not have truth-conditions unless uttered in a particular 
context. Take a simple sentence like “He left his umbrella at home”. 
This sentence, if abstracted from a context of use, does not have truth 
conditions. I do not just mean that we do not know the referent of 
“he” (or “his”) on its deictic use – It is rather a matter of context 
whether it is a deictic use at all. As Kaplan put it, “[p]ronouns are lex-
ically ambiguous, having both an anaphoric and a demonstrative use” 
(Kaplan 1989, 572).  If this sentence is a conversation starter, it may 
only be interpreted deicticly, otherwise it may be anaphoric on pre-
vious terms. In this respect, descriptive uses are no different. It is  
a matter of context, be it linguistic or extralinguistic, whether an in-
dexical is interpreted deicticly, anaphorically (in the standard sense) 
or descriptively. I will argue that contextual considerations that are 
indispensable in disambiguating the sentence are sufficient in provid-
ing a structure of the proposition expressed.     
 Referring to  
 (1)  Traditionally, I am entitled to a last meal, 
Jespersen says that “the sentence as it stands is nonsense, in the light 
sense of nonsense that its truth-condition cannot possibly be satisfied” 
(p. 7). But couldn’t the same be said about “He left his umbrella at 
home” uttered as a stand-alone sentence on the grounds that it does 
not have an antecedent? Yet I doubt that we judge this sentence non-
sensical; we rather interpret this use of “he” as deictic and give it non-
anaphoric truth conditions. So it is not the case that every sentence has 
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one type of truth conditions and is classified as nonsense if those 
truth-conditions are not satisfied, because indexical sentences have at 
least two types of truth-conditions. I think that the deictic truth-
conditions take preference and we apply anaphoric truth conditions 
just because deictic are not applicable. The actual order is, however, 
not important for the argument and I will not argue for it here. An 
acute reader of Jespersen’s paper might insist that he used the phrase 
“its truth-condition cannot possibly be satisfied” and I seem to forget 
about the force of “possibly” here. I do not think that it matters. Since 
for indexical sentences there is no such thing as “its” truth conditions, 
if we mean by that one set of truth-conditions, in the definition of 
nonsense we would require that neither of its conditions can possibly 
be satisfied. Yet once we abandon the comfort of having “the” truth-
conditions for a sentence, there is always the question of considering 
still other possible truth-conditions before declaring something as 
nonsense. In my analysis I indeed postulate a third kind of truth con-
ditions for indexicals.   
 Basing his argument on examples like (1), repeated here: 
 (1)  Traditionally, I am entitled to a last meal, 
Jespersen claims that such sentences are a result of combining two 
sentences into one by applying an invalid rule of universal instantia-
tion inside the scope of “traditionally”: 
 Traditionally, F(x) → G(x) 
 F(a) 
 ―――――――――――――――― 
 Traditionally G(a) 
For this example the premises are “Traditionally, if somebody is  
a condemned prisoner then they are entitled to a last meal.” and “I am 
a condemned prisoner.” (p. 7-8). According to Jespersen “this [...] infe-
rence is the logical backbone of what enables the competent hearer to 
make sense of what the prisoner intends to say” (p. 8), which is that 
“[t]he prisoner wants to be served a last meal” (p. 7). It might sound 
all right in this particular case, but Jespersen claims that this kind of 
reasoning is a general schema, a template, that fits all cases of descrip-
tive uses of indexicals (p. 9, 10). Yet if we applied it to another of 
Nunberg’s examples, it would yield unwanted results. Imagine some-
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one gesturing towards John Paul II, as he delivers a speech with  
a Polish accent shortly after his election, saying:2
 (2)  He is usually an Italian, but this time they thought it wise to 
elect a Pole. 
 
If we apply Jespersen’s schema to (2) we would get the following infe-
rence: 
 Usually, if somebody is the Pope, he is an Italian. 
 John Paul II is the Pope. 
 ――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― 
 John Paul II is an Italian. (or John Paul II is usually an Italian)  
or  
 Usually, if somebody is the Pope, he is an Italian. 
 He is the Pope. 
 ―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― 
 He is an Italian. (or He is usually an Italian) 
Since in the second premise “he” refers to John Paul II (that much fol-
lows from the context), there is no important difference between the 
two schemas. This kind of reasoning is invalid and Jespersen is expli-
cit about that, yet he claims that the conclusion reached in this falla-
cious way helps the hearer figure out the intended meaning – “what 
the speaker intends to convey” (p. 6). But what is the mechanism by 
which the hearer goes from the conclusion to the intended meaning? 
Clearly, in (2) the speaker in no way claims that John Paul II is Italian, 
he says the opposite in the second conjunct of his utterance. In fact, in 
the first conjunct (“He is usually an Italian”) the speaker is not com-
municating anything about John Paul II or any other particular indi-
vidual. Rather, he is expressing a general statement about Popes. So 
the schema Jespersen proposes is not general but rather an ad hoc ex-
planation that, let us assume, works for (1) and maybe some other ex-
amples for reasons that have nothing to do with the phenomenon of 
descriptive uses of indexicals. 
 In what follows, I will propose an account of how we arrive at such 
general propositions as that communicated by (2). I assume that in-
dexicals have default or primary truth-conditions that are either deic-
                                                 
2  This is Recanati’s version of Nunberg’s example (Recanati 2005, 297; Nun-
berg 1992). 
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tic or anaphoric (in the standard sense) but additionally have second-
ary descriptive truth-conditions which I call quasi-anaphoric. The sec-
ondary nature of the last consists in the fact that they are triggered but 
failures of the primary truth conditions. In (2010) and (2010a) I distin-
guish three types of descriptive uses of indexicals but here I will con-
centrate on the first type as all the examples Jespersen mentions as 
well as (2) are of that type.  
 From a default semantic point of view, “he,” as used in (2), refers 
to a particular person present in the context (anaphoric interpretation 
is excluded by the assumption that (2) is a conversation starter). 
“Usually,” on the other hand, is a general quantifier that in this con-
text quantifies over a set of people.3 After all it is people who are Ital-
ian. Thus “he” presupposes singularity, while the quantifier excludes 
it. Therefore the sentence is inconsistent4
                                                 
3  “Usually” is a sort of binary majority quantifier and its logic is a standard 
generalized quantifiers logic (see for example Barwise – Cooper 1981, Pe-
ters – Westerståhl 2006). The reservations about “always” in the next foot-
note apply to “usually” as well. 
4  In the paper Jespersen cites (Kijania-Placek 2010) I have claimed that sen-
tences such as “Today is always the biggest party day of the year” are se-
mantically inconsistent. While I still maintain that they are inconsistent, I 
have been since persuaded by Francois Recanati, Peter Pagin and others 
that the incoherence is not of purely semantic nature. I now think that the 
semantics of most adverbs of quantification does not specify what kind of 
entities these adverbs quantify over. Although in this particular sentence 
“always” does quantify over days, it can quantify over events that can 
take part in one day. In such a case “always” would not conflict with “to-
day”. (Compare Kijania-Placek (submitted)) But since it is a matter of con-
text what adverbs of quantification quantify over, the incoherence of the 
sentence is not strictly semantic. See Lewis (1975). 
 and we do not interpret “he” 
deictically but rather seek its, as I call it, quasi-anaphoric antecedent in 
the context, such that would yield a set of people. The antecedent is 
the object given by the linguistic meaning – Kaplanian character (in 
the case of pure indexicals) or by demonstration in the case of demon-
stratives. For (2) the antecedent is the object being demonstrated – 
John Paul II. As with any anaphoric antecedent, the object is not a re-
ferent of “he”. It points to the object’s salient property. So we look for 
a salient property of the person that is demonstrated; here it is 
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“pope.” This property is the semantic value of the pronoun but is not 
a referent of the pronoun5
Only because ‘traditionally’ is a generalization and because the fact 
that the speaker belongs to the context set is manifest to the speakers, 
it follows from his utterance (on the pattern of “if ∀x (φ(x),ψ(x)) and 
φ(a), then ψ(a)”) that he is entitled to a last meal.  But that is what fol-
lows from his utterance, not what he says. What he says is the general 
proposition that condemned are traditionally entitled to a last meal. 
Had it happened that he is granted a pardon at the last moment, he 
would be the first to admit that he is after all not entitled.
 – it serves as a context set for the general 
quantifier that triggered the quasi-anaphoric interpretation in the first 
place and which constrains the structure of the general proposition 
being expressed. In the case of (2) it is: 
 Usuallyx (pope(x), Italian(x)), 
“Popes are usually Italian” – which accords with the intuition of the 
message conveyed by (2) by not saying anything about John Paul II in 
particular. It gives the correct result for (1) as well:  
 Traditionallyx(condemned prisoner(x), is entitled to a last meal(x)). 
6
 In general, a quasi-anaphoric interpretation of the type exemplified 
by (1) and (2) is triggered at the level of linguistic meaning by the use 
of quantifying words such as ‘traditionally,’ ‘always,’ or ‘usually’ in 
contexts in which they quantify over the same kind of entities that the 
indexicals refer to on their default interpretations. In such contexts 
their meanings clash with the singularity of the default referential 
reading of the indexicals. As a result, we search for discourse antece-
dents of the pronouns yet the antecedents are not supplied explicitly 
by the linguistic contexts but are rather objects identified through the 
 “Usually” 
on the other hand is a majority quantifier and as such does not justify 
analogical entailment.  
                                                 
5  Thus I am in verbal agreement with Jespersen when he claims that indexi-
cals are not vehicles of general reference, but that is probably not what he 
means but his claim. For an argument why descriptively used indexicals 
are not vehicles of general reference see Kijania-Placek (submitted). 
6  And the derivation would no longer be sound, because the second pre-
mise would not be true. 
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linguistic meanings of the pronouns (in case of pure indexicals) or by 
demonstration (for demonstratives). The objects are used as pointers 
to properties corresponding to them in a contextually salient manner. 
The context must be very specific in order to supply just one such 
property, which explains why there are not many convincing exam-
ples of the felicitous use of descriptive indexicals.  
 With respect to the correctness of the descriptive uses of indexicals, 
Jespersen claims that “the competent hearer is someone who both 
knows what the speaker intends to say and also knows that they are 
not saying it quite right” (p. 9). I must admit that I find such utter-
ances like “He is usually an Italian” (context the same as for (2)) quite 
natural and correct. I want to emphasize the fact that in the utterance 
the pronoun “he” is used only once. Had it been used twice, as in the 
title of this paper 
 (3)  He is usually an Italian, but he isn’t, 
it would be a clear case of a playful use of words, as is the case with 
most jokes that rely on an equivocation. In (3) the equivocation is be-
tween the first occurrence of “he”, where it is used descriptively, and 
the second, where it must be assumed to be used deicticly to avoid 
contradiction. Nothing like that happens in (2), where “he” is uttered 
only once.  
 Of course, the descriptive uses of indexicals are not a reliable 
means of communication and, as such, will not be encountered when 
precision is at stake. They rely on the contextual salience of a property 
of an individual and require that this salience be shared by the partic-
ipants of the discourse. The context must be very specific to supply 
just one such property. Often the salience is not shared and communi-
cation fails. Yet descriptive uses of indexicals, if felicitous, are not fal-
lacious or otherwise incorrect. A semanticist is forced to that conclu-
sion only if he assumes that words have meanings outside of sen-
tences and particular occurrences, meanings rich enough to give those 
words’ propositional constituents. Only then there is a problem with 
assuming that “I” does not refer to the speaker in the above sentence. 
But even if that much is granted to the semanticist, he/she would still 
have problem with simpler cases like “John and Jane entered the room 
and John kissed her.” Nothing in the structure of this sentence tells us 
whether “her” is used anaphorically, referring to Jane, or deicticly, re-
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ferring instead to some other salient female. The sentence is ambi-
guous between at least these two readings and the ambiguity can only 
be resolved by context. But if the semanticist would be willing to 
grant that much, why not to allow for other variations in the seman-
tics of particular words?    
 I agree with Jespersen that what is analyzed by a semantics of nat-
ural language is really an ideal language “quasi-natural” or “crisp”, as 
he put it. I do not agree that an adequate analysis may judge systemat-
ically successful utterances as nonsensical. An analysis of natural lan-
guage should be sensitive to facts of the language actual use. If a se-
mantic theory predicts as nonsensical utterances which are systemati-
cally used in successful communication, I am inclined to treat such 
predictions as a refutation of the theory, or at least a call for revision. 
Institute of Philosophy 
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